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Abstract 
The growth of unsolicited commercial email (UCE) imposes increasing costs on 
organizations and causes considerable aggravation on the part of email recipients. A 
thriving anti-spam industry addresses some of the frustration. Regulation and various 
economic and technical means are in the works – all aimed at bringing down the flood of 
unwanted commercial email. This paper contributes to our understanding of the UCE 
phenomenon by drawing on scholarly work in areas of marketing and resource ownership 
and use.  Adapting the tragedy of the commons to the email context, we identify a causal 
structure that drives the direct e-marketing industry. Computer simulations indicate that 
although filtering may be an effective method to curb UCE arriving at individual inboxes, 
it is likely to increase the aggregate volume, thereby boosting overall costs.  We also 
examine other response mechanisms, including self-regulation, government regulation, 
and market mechanisms. The analysis advances understanding of the digital commons, 
the economics of UCE, and has practical implications for the direct e-marketing industry. 
Introduction 
Computer-mediated communication has become one of the accepted channels in the mix 
of outlets that modern companies rely on to advertise their products (Figure 1). Electronic 
mail (email) advertising had nearly a billion dollars in revenue in 2001 and is predicted to 
reach several billion dollars within a few years (Martin, Durme et al. 2003). Reputable 
commercial establishments, such as J.C. Penney, Barnes and Noble, and Borders use 
email for communicating with customers (Martin, Durme et al. 2003). The marketing 
industry’s search for an optimal portfolio of online and traditional advertising (Kover 
1999; Sheehan and Doherty 2001) will eventually evolve into integrated marketing 
communication programs (Brackett and Carr 2001). 
 
A cleverly designed direct marketing campaign contributes to overall sales (Chiang, 
Chhajed et al. 2003).  Email is more attractive than regular mail due to its lower mailing 
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cost, wider reach, convenience, and faster responses (Mehta and Sivadas 1995; Sheehan 
and McMillan 1999; Martin, Durme et al. 2003).   The cost of sending email is $5 to $7 
per one thousand messages, while it is $500 to $700 for the same volume of regular mail 
– two orders of magnitude greater (Martin, Durme et al. 2003).  Moreover, digital 
marketing campaigns are easier to customize, which can produce better response rates 
than for mail campaigns (Ansari and Mela 2003). Timing is also an issue. It takes five to 
ten days to receive a response with email, versus ten to fifteen days with postal surveys 
(Sheehan and McMillan 1999). Finally, by including hyperlinks, email allows a degree of 
interactivity not afforded by conventional direct mail campaigns (Martin, Durme et al. 
2003).    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Shares of 
total marketing 
expenditure in 2003 
by channel. The UK 
case. Adapted from 
DMIS 2004. 
 
Drawbacks of Direct E-Marketing 
 
Despite the many benefits to senders of direct e-marketing campaigns, there are 
pernicious impacts on consumers, email providers, and organizations. Many users are 
angry and frustrated, having to sift through mountains of what they perceive to be 
unsolicited commercial email in their inboxes. Email administrators struggle to maintain 
high service quality in the face of increasing server loads, storage requirements, and 
security threats. Of the roughly 31 billion daily emails sent globally, about 12.4 billion 
(41 percent) are considered UCE
1 – MSN alone blocks 2.4 billion per day.
2  The average 
email user receives 4.5 adult content emails per day, 16 percent of users change their 
email address due to UCE saturation, and 4.5 seconds of corporate time is wasted per 
spam message.
3 With some users receiving hundreds of UCE messages per day
3, it’s no 
wonder that frustration is growing.  Research conducted by the OECD examined the costs 
of UCE, finding that in June 2004, the annual spam cost per employee exceeded $1,900 
and the annual lost productivity per employee equaled 3.1 percent (Anonymous 2004).  
Corporations are burdened by the financial and intangible costs of spam, and managers 
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struggle to find solutions to UCE (Corbitt 2004). They fear that the situation is likely to 
become more grave in the future (Fallows 2003).  
 
The Quest For Eyeballs: Attention as a Scarce Resource 
Over thirty years ago, Nobel laureate Herbert Simon (1971) observed that attention is a 
scarce resource in an information-rich society.  In the parlance of modern theory, the 
attention of workers can be viewed as a strategic asset (Warren 2002) that determines the 
long-term success of an organization. According to Simon (1971, p. 44): “The design 
principle that attention is scarce and must be preserved is very different from a principle 
of “the more information the better.”  When more information arrives than individuals 
can process, an information overload (Simon 1971) occurs, and the likelihood of 
organizational failure increases. 
 
Two different scenarios may lead to information overload: information overload can 
occur because either there is too much information to absorb for a given attention 
resource, or because there is loss of attention resource available for useful information 
processing. For example, someone who is planning a trip may need to review 2000 hotel 
options and be overwhelmed by the task, that is, information overloaded. Or someone can 
be asked to choose between only 50 hotels – a reasonable number – but then also required 
to find the best flight, the best rental car, and the best restaurants in the area. Each 
additional task takes time, and thus leads to loss of attention resource available for 
processing information on hotels. Thus, in the second scenario, processing information on 
only 50 hotels may cause information overload, but now it is because of the loss of 
attention resource.  
 
Examples of information overload are abundant. The first category of information 
overload, when there is more information than can be analyzed by given resources, is 
demonstrated by recent reports about FBI’s inability to process hours of sensitive 
communication that may have high intelligence value (Lichtblau 2004). Perlow (1999) 
gives an example of a situation in which information overload occurs due to the loss of 
attention resource. Perlow describes a software company in which employees were 
continually distracted throughout the day from their primary tasks. The reduced amount 
of attention devoted to productive activities led to chronic project time overruns.  
 
The attention squeeze and information overload are exacerbated by the onslaught of 
UCE, whether viewed from an individual, organizational, or macro level. At an 
individual level, spam is increasing tremendously for some email users
4.  At an 
organizational level, spam as a percentage of regular email is substantial (Melville, Plice 
et al. 2005). On an aggregate level, industry reports suggest a steady upward trend for 
UCE volume. Brightmail, for example, estimates that spam as a percentage of total email 
grew from 49 percent in June 2003 to 65 percent in June 2004, a 33 percent annual 
increase.  More somber news is that spam is moving beyond email to other platforms, 
including instant messaging (spim), blogs, and mobile text messaging.  Given these dire 
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trends and the limited time an individual spends on email, the email recipient is bound to 
experience information overload. 
 
We now extend the concept of attention as a limited resource to the realm of the digital 
commons, reviewing several mitigation mechanisms. We then construct a causal model 
of the UCE industry and use the model to analyze one popular abatement mechanism: 
filtering. The last section summarizes results and outlines further extensions. 
 
Tragedy of the digital commons 
Rapidly increasing spam volume is a result of decisions made by many self-interested 
agents involved in digital marketing. These participants vie for one common resource: the 
attention of email recipients. A typical outcome for a situation in which many profit-
seeking agents compete for the same scarce resource is resource overuse. The suboptimal 
outcome is often described as the tragedy of the commons (Hardin 1968). A vivid 
example is overexploitation of fish stock in the ocean. In an online world in which many 
resources are still open to all: “Management of the digital commons is perhaps the most 
critical issue of market design that our society faces” (McFadden 2001, pp. 61).  
 
The Physical Commons 
When self-interested decisions concerning a common scarce resource degrade the quality 
or quantity of the resource (think fish in oceans), there is said to be a tragedy of the 
commons (Hardin 1968, Mankiw 2001, Mas-Colell, Whinston et al. 1995). A common 
resource is typically identified as one having the following two properties: (i) it is rival, 
that is, when it is used, less is available for others; and (ii) it is nonexclusive, that is, no 
one can be barred from using it. Individuals seek disproportionate private gains through 
the use of the resource but do not bear the full cost. The oceans, forests, grazing lands, 
the atmosphere, outer space, and highways are all susceptible to problems of the 
commons. History is replete with examples of resource degradation by rational, self-
interested individuals: fish in oceans, oil reserves, etc. 
 
The Digital Commons 
The commons problem, however, is not limited to the physical world. Members of early 
Usenet discussion groups in the 1980s faced analogous circumstances: the groups were 
open to everyone and a small set of users could degrade the environment for all. In this 
context “pollution” sprang from various sources – excessive posting or posts that were 
off topic, offensive, or contained advertising – and lowered the value for all. The notion 
of virtual commons was thus applied to an online common resource whose misuse by the 
few degraded the value of the resource for the many (Kollock and Smith 1996).  
 
To formalize the application of commons logic to the Internet, two conditions are 
necessary (Regan 2002). First, the Web must be a “place,” just as the earth is a place. The  5 
Internet is commonly and consistently recognized as a place for conducting a wide array 
of economic and social activity. Everyday metaphors provide evidence in this regard, 
with terms such as “going online,” “size of the internet,” “internet storm,” “virtual 
community,” and “virus” illustrating the mapping of the physical to the virtual. The place 
metaphor is also a fundamental concept used in Internet law: “the cyberspace as place 
metaphor operates as one of the most compelling theories of how we have regulated 
cyberspace to date, and how we are likely to regulate it in the future” (Hunter 2003, pp. 
446).  
 
The second necessary condition of online commons is that it must contain resources 
(analogous to fish stock in oceans) characterized by sharing, the lack of clearly defined 
private ownership, overuse, and negative externalities. A common resource is shared by 
many and private ownership is unclear or non-existent, just as no one owns the depths of 
the oceans and the fish stock in it. The Internet has many resources that involve sharing, 
including public discussion groups, peer-to-peer file sharing networks, and email. Also, 
these areas of cyberspace are characterized by the fact that no one can be barred from 
using them. There is the presence of overuse by rational individuals leading to pollution 
that affects all. In this context, email is a common good (Regan 2002). Spam is clearly 
the result of rational businesspersons whose private revenues exceed costs to society. 
Spam exhibits signs of a negative externality, which results in production that is higher 
than society desires. This is evidenced by the bombardment of email addresses with spam 
and the resulting financial and non-pecuniary costs borne by each of the millions of users, 
their respective email administrators, and employers. Table 1 draws parallels between 
UCE and fish population, which is a canonical common resource suffering from the 
tragedy of the commons. As the online commons is not a biological system, we take care 
in drawing the analogy homomorphically, i.e., by “paying attention to the peculiarities of 
the digital environment as well” (Greco and Floridi 2004). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1: Comparison of a Physical and Online Commons 
 F ISHERIES UCE 
COMMON RESOURCE  Fish stock in oceans  Attention of email users 
SELF-INTERESTED BEHAVIOR  Fish as much as possible  Send as much UCE as possible 
TECHNIQUE  Fishing expeditions  Marketing campaigns 
TRAGEDY Over  fishing  Information  overload 
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Solutions to the digital commons tragedy 
Researchers have analyzed property rights, privacy, externalities, regulation, and 
incentives in the context of common resources such as forests and grazing lands, bringing 
a wide variety of perspectives and research methodologies to bear on the problem. Here, 
we briefly review three broadly defined corrective approaches to the tragedy of the 
commons: 1) self-regulation through community norms; 2) government control and 
regulation; and 3) price and market mechanisms.   
 
Self-regulation 
Even though societal norms sometimes prevent the tragedy of the commons from 
occurring (see Lessig 2001: 22, note 9), it is unlikely that such self-regulation will work 
in the case of spam. In theory, the Coase theorem (e.g. Mankiw 2001) predicts that 
parties which are locked in a situation with negative externalities may negotiate their way 
out of the problem if property rights are clear and transaction costs are small. Inboxes, of 
course, have clearly defined property rights. Senders’ identity, however, is 
misrepresented in about 70 percent of spam messages (Fallows 2003: 13). Moreover, 
locating the source of spam is not trivial. It took Earthlink a year and a team of 12 
professionals to track only one spammer (Black 2003). Hence, the Coase theorem breaks 
down on this ground alone. Revamping the email protocol to make it more difficult to 
hide one’s identity (Fallows 2003) may resolve the spammer identification problem.  But 
even then, the transaction cost of reaching a settlement between millions of email users 
and spammers is likely to be excessively high for self-regulation to work.  
 
Government Regulation 
The second mechanism is government regulation. In the United States, for example, UCE 
has induced a plethora of anti-spam legislation, notably, the 2004 CAN-SPAM Act, and 
legislative activity is likely to increase (Fallows 2003). Given the cultural dimensions of 
spam, regulatory responses have varied by country (Gratton 2004). The approach of the 
European Union has been to ban spam outright, with steep fines for violators. In contrast, 
the approach in the U.S. has been to allow spam, provided several constraints are met, 
including consistency between message subject and message content as well as indication 
in the subject line that it is advertising. Regardless of the specific approach, 
enforceability remains an issue, as the Internet is borderless and it is easy to locate email 
servers offshore.  
 
The debate about the effectiveness of the anti-spam laws is heated (Ray and Schmitt 
2003; Sipior, Ward et al. 2004). Some have even suggested that anti-spam laws will 
result in an increase in spam (Squillante 2003).  The European Commission 
acknowledged in a recent report that spam cannot be stopped by regulation alone (Swartz 
2004b). In the U.S., the CAN-SPAM Act does not appear to be working and the volume 
of spam still growing (Swartz 2004b). According to MX Logic, at most 3 percent of spam 
follows the CAN-SPAM rules (MX Logic 2004). Undoubtedly, recent lawsuits by major  7 
U.S.-based email providers using the U.S. CAN-SPAM act will set important precedents. 
We will explore the regulatory scenarios in our future work. 
 
Market Mechanisms 
Market mechanisms for controlling spam are still in the developing stages. One popular 
idea is the introduction of electronic stamps (Leyden 2004).  Fixed e-postage is not unlike 
the Pigovian tax (Mankiw 2001), a classical regulatory mechanism by which 
governments charge a fixed fee for each unit of pollution. Even though lab experiments 
(Kraut, Sunder et al. 2002) and basic economic theory suggest that postage is likely to 
reduce UCE volume, the theory of the Pigovian tax suggests that the mechanism may 
miss the optimal spam production point. If the postage amount is not set correctly, then 
there might be either underproduction or overproduction of UCE.  The U.S. government 
has also attempted to address the problem of environment degradation by creating a 
market for tradable pollution permits (Mankiw 2001). This policy is often considered 
superior to a Pigovian tax. An idea similar to tradable pollution permits but for the realm 
of electronic marketing was proposed by Fahlman (2002).  
 
There are several other market mechanisms in the works, including attention bonds (Van 
Alstyne et al 2004). However, due to their early-stage development, it is difficult to know 
which, if any, may achieve success. 
 
Having outlined the digital commons problem and described several mitigation 
mechanisms, we now describe the simulation model that enables analysis of UCE 
dynamics and the assessment of the most popular UCE mitigation mechanism: filtering. 
 
Dynamic analysis of filtering 
Conventional commons problems such as over fishing have been modeled as dynamic 
systems (e.g. FishBanks interactive computer simulation
5). The system is comprised of at 
least two agents whose quests for private gain reinforce each other until curtailed by 
limits in the environment. In the case of fishing, each agent will maximize revenue or 
profit until the system is overrun and fish stocks become depleted. Our approach is to 
adapt this model to the case of the online commons, specifically, UCE. To the best of our 
knowledge, this approach to studying spam is unique and it allows leveraging what we 
already know about physical commons to the problems of online commons.  
 
We model the UCE value chain as having four participants: 1) inbox owners, 2) 
harvesters, 3) operators, and 4) sponsors. The inbox population is the set of feasible 
recipients of unwanted commercial e-mail. Harvesters are in the business of discovering 
inboxes and compiling them into lists of e-mail addresses, which they sell to UCE 
operators. UCE operators administer spam campaigns, which promote products from 
sponsors. Finally, sponsors support campaigns based on their success rate.   We now 
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explain the dynamic processes relating these four value chain participants illustrated in 
Figure 2. 
 
Address Harvesting 
To receive UCE, an inbox address must be discovered by a harvester. There are hundreds 
of ways to collect inbox addresses (Brain 2004). One of them is via directory harvest 
attacks (DHA), in which automated programs query email servers for the existence of 
millions of commonly designated usernames
6. A study by the Center for Democracy and 
Technology (Center for Democracy & Technology 2003) reports that harvesters are also 
very effective at gathering email addresses posted on the web. There are also clearly 
illegal harvesting techniques, such as when an AOL employee was recently arrested for 
stealing the email addresses of 92 million AOL users (Swartz 2004a). The employee then 
sold the list to an operator of an online gambling business in Las Vegas for $100,000. 
That person in turn repackaged and resold the addresses to spammers for over a million 
dollars.  Considering the many ways in which harvesters add email addresses to their 
lists, it is reasonable to assume that it is only a matter of time before an email account is 
discovered (see Figure 2). We model this by including an average inbox discovery delay. 
Delays, including the discovery delay, are shown in Figure 2 as two short lines crossing 
an arrow.  
 
Attention and Information Overload 
The attention resource can be measured in terms of time (Simon 1971). According to a 
recent survey conducted by the American Management Association, an employee 
typically spends about a quarter of her day on email (Swartz 2004b).  Employees whose 
inboxes have been discovered possess a limited attention resource. The total demand for 
attention from regular and UCE email is proportional to their respective volumes 
delivered to inboxes. Assuming that regular email has a higher priority than spam, the 
time left for UCE is the difference between the attention resource and the attention 
devoted to regular email (see Figure 2). If the arriving volume of electronic messages is 
greater than what an individual is comfortable handling, then, using Herbert Simon’s 
terminology, information overload occurs.  
 
Response Rate 
Advertisers have known about the negative relationship between advertising volume that 
an individual is exposed to and the response rate to advertisements (Rudolph 1947; 
Starch 1966; Houston and Scott 1984). Houston and Scott (1984), for example, 
statistically showed a negative convex relationship between advertising readership and 
the number of pages in a journal. Recent research shows that the negative relationship 
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holds equally well for electronic marketing. Martin et al. (2003) found that in the case of 
permission-based advertising for a company operating from Finland, the likelihood of 
visiting a link advertised within an email decreased as volume of email from the company 
increased. A recent survey by the Pew Internet & American Life Project (Rainie and 
Fallows 2004) found a decline in the readership of  UCE while the UCE volume 
increased.  Anecdotal evidence from UCE operators (Hansell 2003) also confirms the 
existence of a negative relationship between the amount of spam that a finite group 
receives and the response rate. This is indicated by the loop in Figure 2 comprising UCE 
volume - attention required by UCE - information overload - response rate.  
 
Profitability 
For a given overall response rate, the total number of responses a company receives 
increases with its share in the email volume (in Figure 2, this is captured by positive links 
between UCE Volume from Operator and Responses to UCE from Operator). More 
responses imply more revenue (see Figure 2). More revenue means more profit. Greater 
profit implies that with some delay (shown as two short lines crossing an arrow in Figure 
2) more budget is allocated for UCE by a sponsor and thus expenditure on UCE volume 
increases. The UCE volume that a sponsor can buy for a given expenditure is inversely 
proportional to the UCE price that an operator charges for sending electronic messages.  
 
It is clear from the graph in Figure 2 that there is a tendency to step up UCE volume 
while profits from UCE campaigns increase. This is captured by two positive Sponsor 
Profit Loops.  Starting new campaigns is easy and quick thanks to specialized software 
packages (Lemke 2003). An example of such a tool is iBuilder from VerticalResponse
7. 
Hence, campaigns have low marginal cost, and therefore cost recovery is unimportant 
(Kraut, Sunder et al. 2002). A campaign requires a very low response rate to break even: 
0.001 percent is often sufficient (Fallows 2003: 26). The causality acting through the 
response rate forms the Attention Limit Loop (Figure 2), which checks the exponential 
growth of spam. 
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Figure 2: The causal structure of the UCE system 
 
 
 
Results: Base Case 
 
We conducted computer simulations for a fictitious organization with 10,000 inboxes. 
The organization could be, for example, a company with employees or an email provider 
hosting email accounts. We allow only a small portion of the accounts to be initially 
known to spammers. In the model, we assume that UCE budget is proportional to the 
profitability of UCE campaigns; that is, the more profitable the UCE, the greater budget 
will be allocated for e-marketing. Table 2 summarizes the assumptions of the model. 
Parameter values were suggested by published surveys and anecdotal evidence from 
experts. Appendix offers a detailed mathematical description of the model. 
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Figure 3 shows the base run for the simulated two years of life of our fictitious 
organization. As expected, given the fixed number of inboxes, the total number of 
discovered inboxes grows monotonically and asymptotically toward the total inbox 
population (Figure 3a). Within two years, more than 80% of the inboxes have been 
discovered. Positive profits accrued through spam campaigns (Figure 3b) encourage 
sponsors to allocate even more resources for electronic marketing (Figure 3c and Figure 
2). Greater UCE budgets allow each sponsor to spend more on email (sponsor’s 
expenditure in Figure 2), which contributes to the growth of the UCE volume from 
operator A and B (Figure 2). Hence, global UCE volume grows as well (Figure 3d and 
Figure 2). The UCE volume that arrives to an individual inbox also grows exponentially 
(Figure 3e), which is consistent with real life examples (see Footnote 4).  
 
 
(a)  (b) 
(c ) 
(d)  
Table 2: Model assumptions 
 
  
Item Implementation  Source 
Organization size  10000 inboxes  Assumption 
Initial population of discovered 
inboxes  10 Inboxes  Assumption 
Time spent on email by an employee  2 Hours/day  Swartz 2004b 
Average regular email volume 20  Messages/day    Assumption 
 
Base price of sending 1,000 UCE 
messages 
$5 per 1000 messages   Martin, Durme et al. 2003 
Response rate  A declining function of UCE volume  See Response Rate section above 
Email marketing budget 
 
Allocated proportionally to the past 
profit from the UCE campaign 
Assumption 
Inboxes
15,000
11,250
7,500
3,750
0
0 73 146 219 292 365 438 511 584 657 730
Time (Day)
Total 
inboxes
Discovered 
inboxes
Profit
400,000
300,000
200,000
100,000
0
0 73 146 219 292 365 438 511 584 657 730
Time (Day)
UCE budget
800,000
600,000
400,000
200,000
0
0 73 146 219 292 365 438 511 584 657 730
Time (Day)
UCE volume
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600,000
400,000
200,000
0
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Time (Day) 12 
(e ) 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: UCE system simulated for 2 
years 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Results: The Impact of Spam Filtering 
When foreseeing an approaching information overload, Herbert Simon suggested in the 
early 1970s that filtering might be a possible solution (Simon 1971). Filtering of 
unsolicited email has proven to be capable of reducing demand for attention: users report 
lesser burden of spam at work than on their personal email accounts due to active email 
screening efforts at work (Fallows 2003). The popularity of this solution feeds the growth 
of a new and active anti-spam software industry. The method, however, has its flaws.  
Many inbox users fear that aggressive filtering may lead to some legitimate email being 
discarded. A survey by the Pew Internet Project (Fallows 2003: 29) found that about one 
third of the respondents feared their incoming email might be blocked, and 13 percent 
were convinced that it happened to them. About a quarter of respondents feared that their 
outgoing emails might be filtered out by the intended recipient.   
 
In this section we study the effect of filtering on UCE volume using the computer model 
introduced earlier. We assume that the organization starts filtering email in the third year.  
To address fears that legitimate email may be discarded, the organization discards only 
UCE-suspects that it is most confident about. An interested reader can find a detailed 
account of the filtering procedures followed by a typical medium-sized organization in 
Melville et al. (2005).  
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Figure 4: Organization simulated for 
7 years with and without filtering 
policy in place 
 
Figure 4 shows a simulation that extends the run in Figure 3 for five more years (2555 
days total).  The figure compares the case when filtering is used to the case when no 
filtering is implemented.  Under each scenario, during the seven-year period, harvesters 
discover all inboxes (Figure 4 a). Figures 7b – 7e depict the case when the organization 
performs no active filtering with dotted lines. As in the base case simulation discussed 
earlier, driven by the two Sponsor Profit Loops (see Figure 2), each operator continues to 
increase UCE production. This leads to the growth in global volume of unsolicited 
messages (Figure 4 b), which in turn contributes to the increase in spam arriving to 
individual accounts (Figure 4 c). Eventually, attention required by UCE outgrows 
attention available for UCE and information overload becomes more strongly felt (see 
Figure 2). Email recipients, who are overwhelmed by increasing volumes of spam (Figure 
4 c), tend to delete most of it, thus driving the overall response rate down (see Figure 2 
and ‘no filtering’ case in Figure 4 d). The declining response rate leads to lower revenue 
and lower profit (see Figure 2 to trace the logic and Figure 4 e for the resulting profit 
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trajectory). With some delay, the declining financial performance of the electronic 
marketing campaigns affects the sponsors’ UCE budgets (Figure 2).  As a result, the UCE 
volume tapers off (later portions of Figure 4 b).    
 
Let us now examine the effect of filtering, which is clearly visible starting in year three. 
Filtering reduces the burden from UCE on an individual by lowering UCE volume 
arriving to an individual inbox (solid line in Figure 4 c). Feeling less overwhelmed by 
incoming spam, readers tend to read a greater fraction of incoming messages, thus 
increasing the overall response rate (solid line in Figure 4 d). Better response rates drive 
profitability upwards (solid line in Figure 4 e).  Better profitability encourages greater 
UCE budgets (Figure 2), thus allowing sponsors to spend more on email marketing. 
Greater expenditure by each sponsor boosts overall UCE volume (filtered case in Figure 4 
b).  Hence, an interesting result is that, while lowering the burden of spam on individuals 
(Figure 4 c), filtering is likely to increase overall volume of UCE (Figure 4 b).   
Discussion  
In this paper we addressed the growing problem of unsolicited commercial email. 
Adopting the viewpoint that in an information-rich society attention is a limited resource 
– a notion proffered by Herbert Simon (1971) – allowed us to describe the problem of 
spam in terms of a common resource. The common resource framework is well 
understood in economic literature and has been helpful in explaining many phenomena 
that lead to the overexploitation of limited resources. The situation of overexploitation of 
a resource by self-interested agents is generally referred to as the tragedy of the 
commons. The framework has been applied to other Internet-related problems. When 
applied to the virtual world, the phenomenon has been dubbed the tragedy of the digital 
commons.  
 
We reviewed several solutions to the spam problem: self-regulation, government 
regulation, market mechanisms, and filtering. We concluded that based on theoretical and 
empirical evidence neither self-regulation, nor government regulation is likely to resolve 
the problem. In view of the commons theory and its applications to the cases when 
traditional resources are overused, market mechanisms appear to be quite promising; but 
they are still in their early development stages. Finally, we offered a simulation analysis 
of filtering, which is currently the most popular option to combat UCE.  
 
Filtering has been proposed as a possible solution to information overload long before 
email became popular (Simon 1971). Filtering, however, may impose costs that exceed 
the benefit (Cranor and Lamacchia 1998). The benefit is the reduction of spam volume 
arriving to an individual inbox. However, as our discussion in the previous sections 
showed, the use of filtering is likely to stimulate production of spam. Greater spam 
volume consumes more of organizations’ bandwidth and processing resources (Melville, 
Plice et al. 2005). Secondly, organizations and spam senders iteratively improve their 
filtering and electronic marketing tools, respectively, with no clear end to, or winner of, 
such an arms race. The continuous anti-spam effort is costly. Thirdly, inbox owners bear 
the cost too because false positives during spam filtering lead to the deletion of desired  15 
email. From a theoretical standpoint, this reduces consumer surplus (Loder, Van Alstyne 
et al. 2004).  Table 3 summarizes benefits and drawbacks of the filtering solution.  
 
 
Table 3: Benefit and drawbacks of the filtering solution 
Benefit 
Lower UCE volume to an inbox 
Drawbacks 
Greater global volume of UCE 
Emergence of the costly “anti-spam arms race” 
False-positives lower consumer surplus 
 
 
Our analysis has several practical implications. Because of its effectiveness at the 
individual level, filtering will inevitably increase in popularity.  Considering that many 
individuals still do not use filtering software and only 28 percent of small and medium 
size enterprises have active anti-spam measures in place (PR Newswire 2004), the growth 
in the filtering effort is likely to be very significant. As our simulations suggest, 
proliferation of filtering will further boost the global UCE volume. It will also encourage 
an arms race between IT managers and the filtering software companies on the one side 
and spam operators on the opposing side. Owners of filtering software companies are 
well positioned to benefit financially from the situation. Consumers and IT managers, on 
the other hand, will pay for the new upgrades of the filtering software and for the addition 
of processing and bandwidth capacity needed to handle the increased UCE volume. 
Moreover, greater reliance on filtering will make the task of legitimate electronic 
advertisers harder, as without the reliance on obfuscating tricks used by spammers, direct 
marketers are easy targets for filtering.  Hence, to remain effective, the direct marketing 
industry will need to do the following: (i) foster relationships with customers; (ii) be 
sensitive to the optimal emailing frequency; (iii) limit email to customers who consented 
to receiving such communication; (iv) target and customize email, so as to make email 
communication useful to the recipient; (v) use email as only one dimension in a 
comprehensive marketing campaign; and (vi) actively distinguish itself from UCE.  
 
In our future work we will apply the theoretical framework and the computer model 
developed in this paper to in-depth analysis of various marketing solutions to the spam 
problem. We will also introduce some novel anti-spam ideas, such as an information 
economics solution based on mailing-list quality.    
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Appendix 
Below are the model equations. Note that the described Profitability is for sponsor A and 
operator A. Equations for the profit loop formed by sponsor B and operator B are 
identical and differ from A only in terms of subscripts. 
 
Address Harvesting   
  Average time to discovery  d t  
 Undiscovered  inboxes  u I  
 Discovered  inboxes  ( ) // du d dd tI I t =  
 Total  inboxes  ud I II = +  
  Fraction of inboxes discovered  / d iII =  
   
Attention and Information Overload  
  Time an employee can spend on email  T  
  Attention resource of an organization  A TI = ⋅  
  Discovered attention resource  d A iA = ⋅  
  Time it takes to read an email  e 
  Regular email volume to discovered inboxes  r E  
  Attention devoted to regular mail  rr A eE = ⋅  
  Attention available for UCE  UCE d r A AA = −  
 UCE  volume  UCE A B EE E = +  
  Attention required by UCE  UCE De E = ⋅  
 Information  overload  / UCE OD A =  
    
Response Rate   
  Maximum response rate  max r  
 Response  rate  ( ) max rr f O =⋅  
  () f O   ( ) 01 fO ≤ ≤       ( ) '0 fO <  
   
Profitability   
 Sponsor  A’s  profit  AA M C π = −  
 Budget  duration  τ  
 Average  daily  profit  ( ) ( ) // dd t π ππτ =−  
 Sponsor  A’s  expenditure  / AA CB τ =  
  Price of UCE  p 
  UCE volume from operator A  / AA EC p =  
  Responses to UCE from operator A  AA Rr E = ⋅  
  Average revenue per sale  m 
 Sponsor  A’s  revenue  AA M mR = ⋅  
 Marketing  fraction  a  
  Adjustment of spam budget   Ba π + = ⋅  
  Sponsor A’s UCE budget  ( ) / AA dd tB B C + = −  
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